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Hi to all the people of the Philippines especially all the. I don't care, as long as you love me, baby. Composers Backstreet Boys Release date Sep 13, 2000 Last Updated Nov 6, 2020 Genre Pop Arrangement Melody Line, Lyrics & Chords Arrangement Code FKBK SKU 13952 Number of pages 2 Minimum Purchase QTY 1 Price $6. I'm leavin' my life in your hands. 24Doesn't really matter if you're on the run. As long as you love me lyrics backstreet chords. Up (featuring Demi Lovato). Please contact us at [email protected].

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Percussion Instruments. So the song got cut, mastered, and put on the album, and it became the single. '' ''Quit Playing Games'' had such a melodic melody, easy listening to it — that's really where ''As Long As You Love Me'' came from, when you listen to sounds and the guitars and keyboards and the chord structure. Trumpet-Cornet-Flugelhorn. Click playback or notes icon at the bottom of the interactive viewer and check if "As Long As You Love Me" availability of playback & transpose functionality prior to purchase. By: Instruments: |Piano Voice|. In which year was As Long as You Love Me first released? These other 2 riffs are played randomly in parts of the song. Karang - Out of tune? Other Plucked Strings. And the video for As Long as You Love Me was directed by Nigel Dick and filmed on June 15, 1997 in Pasadena, California. As long as you love me lyrics backstreet chords free. Other Software and Apps. By Danny Baranowsky.

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But I guess it shows. As long as you love me (I don't know). Includes 1 print + interactive copy with lifetime access in our free apps. Max Martin is a genius with the same four chords. '' Percussion Accessories. Product Type: Musicnotes. In order to transpose click the "notes" icon at the bottom of the viewer. Feels like it's deep within me. Hover to zoom | Click to enlarge.

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Don't care what you did (yeah). Instructions how to enable JavaScript in your web browser. Lips Of An Angel - Hinder (Guitar Chords Tutorial with Lyrics). Classical Collections.

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The same court later explained that "actual physical control" was "intending to prevent intoxicated drivers from entering their vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants as in Bugger.... " Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P. 2d 651, 654 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). Petersen v. Department of Public Safety, 373 N. 2d 38, 40 (S. 1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting). City of Cincinnati v. Mr. robinson was quite ill recently released. Kelley, 47 Ohio St. 2d 94, 351 N. E. 2d 85, 87- 88 (1976) (footnote omitted), cert. The court reached this conclusion based on its belief that "it is reasonable to allow a driver, when he believes his driving is impaired, to pull completely off the highway, turn the key off and sleep until he is sober, without fear of being arrested for being in control. " 2d 483, 485-86 (1992). 3] We disagree with this construction of "actual physical control, " which we consider overly broad and excessively rigid.

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We do not believe the legislature meant to forbid those intoxicated individuals who emerge from a tavern at closing time on a cold winter night from merely entering their vehicles to seek shelter while they sleep off the effects of alcohol. In the instant case, stipulations that Atkinson was in the driver's seat and the keys were in the ignition were strong factors indicating he was in "actual physical control. " The engine was off, although there was no indication as to whether the keys were in the ignition or not. By using the word "actual, " the legislature implied a current or imminent restraining or directing influence over a vehicle. Mr. robinson was quite ill recently announced. Courts pursuing this deterrence-based policy generally adopt an extremely broad view of "actual physical control. " Emphasis in original).

Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So. Accordingly, the words "actual physical control, " particularly when added by the legislature in the disjunctive, indicate an intent to encompass activity different than, and presumably broader than, driving, operating, or moving the vehicle. Even the presence of such a statutory definition has failed to settle the matter, however. One can discern a clear view among a few states, for example, that "the purpose of the 'actual physical control' offense is [as] a preventive measure, " State v. Schuler, 243 N. W. 2d 367, 370 (N. D. 1976), and that " 'an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public. ' Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1706 (1986) defines "physical" as "relating to the body... Mr. robinson was quite ill recently published. often opposed to mental. " As for the General Assembly's addition of the term "actual physical control" in 1969, we note that it is a generally accepted principle of statutory construction that a statute is to be read so that no word or phrase is "rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. " See Jackson, 443 U. at 319, 99 at 2789, 61 at 573; Tichnell, 287 Md.

Most importantly, "actual" is defined as "present, " "current, " "existing in fact or reality, " and "in existence or taking place at the time. " The Supreme Court of Ohio, for example, defined "actual physical control" as requiring that "a person be in the driver's seat of a vehicle, behind the steering wheel, in possession of the ignition key, and in such condition that he is physically capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move. " For example, on facts much akin to those of the instant case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that a defendant who was found unconscious in his vehicle parked some twenty feet off the highway with the engine off, the lights off, and the key in the ignition but off, was in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. 2d 1144, 1147 (Ala. 1986). No one factor alone will necessarily be dispositive of whether the defendant was in "actual physical control" of the vehicle.

Balanced against these facts were the circumstances that the vehicle was legally parked, the ignition was off, and Atkinson was fast asleep. Adams v. State, 697 P. 2d 622, 625 (Wyo. In State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P. 2d 442 (1971), the defendant was discovered asleep in his automobile which was parked on the shoulder of the road, completely off the travel portion of the highway. The court defined "actual physical control" as " 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation, ' " and held that "the defendant at the time of his arrest was not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any dominion over it. " Richmond v. State, 326 Md. We believe no such crime exists in Maryland. See generally Annotation, What Constitutes Driving, Operating, or Being in Control of Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Driving While Intoxicated Statute or Ordinance, 93 A. L. R. 3d 7 (1979 & 1992 Supp. Quoting Hughes v. State, 535 P. 2d 1023, 1024 ()) (both cases involved defendant seated behind the steering wheel of vehicle parked partially in the roadway with the key in the ignition). The court concluded that "while the defendant remained behind the wheel of the truck, the pulling off to the side of the road and turning off the ignition indicate that defendant voluntarily ceased to exercise control over the vehicle prior to losing consciousness, " and it reversed his conviction. And while we can say that such people should have stayed sober or planned better, that does not realistically resolve this all-too-frequent predicament.

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In these states, the "actual physical control" language is construed as intending "to deter individuals who have been drinking intoxicating liquor from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers. " At least one state, Idaho, has a statutory definition of "actual physical control. " This view, at least insofar as it excuses a drunk driver who was already driving but who subsequently relinquishes control, might be subject to criticism as encouraging drunk drivers to test their skills by attempting first to drive before concluding that they had better not. The court said: "An intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of an automobile is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public. 2d 735 (1988), discussed supra, where the court concluded that evidence of the ignition key in the "on" position, the glowing alternator/battery light, the gear selector in "drive, " and the warm engine, sufficiently supported a finding that the defendant had actually driven his car shortly before the officer's arrival. What may be an unduly broad extension of this "sleep it off" policy can be found in the Arizona Supreme Court's Zavala v. State, 136 Ariz. 356, 666 P. 2d 456 (1983), which not only encouraged a driver to "sleep it off" before attempting to drive, but also could be read as encouraging drivers already driving to pull over and sleep. ' " State v. Schwalk, 430 N. 2d 317, 319 (N. 1988) (quoting Buck v. North Dakota State Hgwy.

Indeed, once an individual has started the vehicle, he or she has come as close as possible to actually driving without doing so and will generally be in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. 2d 701, 703 () (citing State v. Purcell, 336 A. We believe that the General Assembly, particularly by including the word "actual" in the term "actual physical control, " meant something more than merely sleeping in a legally parked vehicle with the ignition off. FN6] Still, some generalizations are valid. In this instance, the context is the legislature's desire to prevent intoxicated individuals from posing a serious public risk with their vehicles. Neither the statute's purpose nor its plain language supports the result that intoxicated persons sitting in their vehicles while in possession of their ignition keys would, regardless of other circumstances, always be subject to criminal penalty. As long as a person is physically or bodily able to assert dominion in the sense of movement by starting the car and driving away, then he has substantially as much control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving it.

Management Personnel Servs. In sum, the primary focus of the inquiry is whether the person is merely using the vehicle as a stationary shelter or whether it is reasonable to assume that the person will, while under the influence, jeopardize the public by exercising some measure of control over the vehicle. 2d 407, 409 (D. C. 1991) (stating in dictum that "[e]ven a drunk with the ignition keys in his pocket would be deemed sufficiently in control of the vehicle to warrant conviction. We believe that, by using the term "actual physical control, " the legislature intended to differentiate between those inebriated people who represent no threat to the public because they are only using their vehicles as shelters until they are sober enough to drive and those people who represent an imminent threat to the public by reason of their control of a vehicle. Rather, each must be considered with an eye towards whether there is in fact present or imminent exercise of control over the vehicle or, instead, whether the vehicle is merely being used as a stationary shelter. Further, when interpreting a statute, we assume that the words of the statute have their ordinary and natural meaning, absent some indication to the contrary. In Zavala, an officer discovered the defendant sitting unconscious in the driver's seat of his truck, with the key in the ignition, but off. Active or constructive possession of the vehicle's ignition key by the person charged or, in the alternative, proof that such a key is not required for the vehicle's operation; 2.

Perhaps the strongest factor informing this inquiry is whether there is evidence that the defendant started or attempted to start the vehicle's engine. In Garcia, the court held that the defendant was in "actual physical control" and not a "passive occupant" when he was apprehended while in the process of turning the key to start the vehicle. Idaho Code § 18- 8002(7) (1987 & 1991); Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P. 2d 401, 403 (1988). Superior Court for Greenlee County, 153 Ariz. 119, 735 P. 2d 149, 152 (). As a practical matter, we recognize that any definition of "actual physical control, " no matter how carefully considered, cannot aspire to cover every one of the many factual variations that one may envision. Because of the varying tests and the myriad factual permutations, synthesizing or summarizing the opinions of other courts appears futile. Statutory language, whether plain or not, must be read in its context. Accordingly, a person is in "actual physical control" if the person is presently exercising or is imminently likely to exercise "restraining or directing influence" over a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. In the words of a dissenting South Dakota judge, this construction effectively creates a new crime, "Parked While Intoxicated. " NCR Corp. Comptroller, 313 Md.

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The danger is less than that involved when the vehicle is actually moving; however, the danger does exist and the degree of danger is only slightly less than when the vehicle is moving. The Arizona Court of Appeals has since clarified Zavala by establishing a two-part test for relinquishing "actual physical control"--a driver must "place his vehicle away from the road pavement, outside regular traffic lanes, and... turn off the ignition so that the vehicle's engine is not running. The court set out a three-part test for obtaining a conviction: "1. Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So. As we have already said with respect to the legislature's 1969 addition of "actual physical control" to the statute, we will not read a statute to render any word superfluous or meaningless. The court said: "We can expect that most people realize, as they leave a tavern or party intoxicated, that they face serious sanctions if they drive. Webster's also defines "control" as "to exercise restraining or directing influence over. "

Thus, we must give the word "actual" some significance. While the preferred response would be for such people either to find alternate means of getting home or to remain at the tavern or party without getting behind the wheel until sober, this is not always done. Denied, 429 U. S. 1104, 97 1131, 51 554 (1977). Thus, our construction of "actual physical control" as permitting motorists to "sleep it off" should not be misconstrued as encouraging motorists to try their luck on the roadways, knowing they can escape arrest by subsequently placing their vehicles "away from the road pavement, outside regular traffic lanes, and... turn[ing] off the ignition so that the vehicle's engine is not running. "

We therefore join other courts which have rejected an inflexible test that would make criminals of all people who sit intoxicated in a vehicle while in possession of the vehicle's ignition keys, without regard to the surrounding circumstances. A vehicle that is operable to some extent. Although the definition of "driving" is indisputably broadened by the inclusion in § 11-114 of the words "operate, move, or be in actual physical control, " the statute nonetheless relates to driving while intoxicated. V. Sandefur, 300 Md. For the intoxicated person caught between using his vehicle for shelter until he is sober or using it to drive home, [prior precedent] encourages him to attempt to quickly drive home, rather than to sleep it off in the car, where he will be a beacon to police. We have no such contrary indications here, so we examine the ordinary meaning of "actual physical control. " In view of the legal standards we have enunciated and the circumstances of the instant case, we conclude there was a reasonable doubt that Atkinson was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle, an essential element of the crime with which he was charged. The inquiry must always take into account a number of factors, however, including the following: 1) whether or not the vehicle's engine is running, or the ignition on; 2) where and in what position the person is found in the vehicle; 3) whether the person is awake or asleep; 4) where the vehicle's ignition key is located; 5) whether the vehicle's headlights are on; 6) whether the vehicle is located in the roadway or is legally parked. More recently, the Alabama Supreme Court abandoned this strict, three-pronged test, adopting instead a "totality of the circumstances test" and reducing the test's three prongs to "factors to be considered. " Id., 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P. 2d at 443 (citations omitted and emphasis in original). While the Idaho statute is quite clear that the vehicle's engine must be running to establish "actual physical control, " that state's courts have nonetheless found it necessary to address the meaning of "being in the driver's position. " Courts must in each case examine what the evidence showed the defendant was doing or had done, and whether these actions posed an imminent threat to the public.

Those were the facts in the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Gore v. State, 74 143, 536 A. Superior Court for Greenlee County, 153 Ariz. 2d at 152 (citing Zavala, 136 Ariz. 2d at 459). Thus, rather than assume that a hazard exists based solely upon the defendant's presence in the vehicle, we believe courts must assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case. The policy of allowing an intoxicated individual to "sleep it off" in safety, rather than attempt to drive home, arguably need not encompass the privilege of starting the engine, whether for the sake of running the radio, air conditioning, or heater. While we wish to discourage intoxicated individuals from first testing their drunk driving skills before deciding to pull over, this should not prevent us from allowing people too drunk to drive, and prudent enough not to try, to seek shelter in their cars within the parameters we have described above. For example, a person asleep on the back seat, under a blanket, might not be found in "actual physical control, " even if the engine is running. Position of the person charged in the driver's seat, behind the steering wheel, and in such condition that, except for the intoxication, he or she is physically capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move; 3.